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“WHERE IS MY VOTE?”: DEMOCRATIZING 
IRANIAN ELECTION LAW THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RECOURSE 
Tanya Otsuka* 
Abstract: In 2009, massive demonstrations ensued in response to the al-
legedly fraudulent reelection of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadine-
jad. The Iranian government met these protests with violence, imprison-
ment, and death. Yet, given the Iranian government’s structure and 
election law, the ability to resolve election disputes through domestic le-
gal means is virtually non-existent. Many provisions of Iranian election law 
are democratically flawed, even though Iran is a party to numerous inter-
national agreements requiring free and fair elections. This Note exam-
ines the availability of international legal recourse for the provisions of 
Iran’s election law that fail to live up to these standards. The Note sug-
gests that the international community apply multi-lateral political pres-
sure to encourage Iranian election reform. 
Introduction 
 As thousands of Iranians took to the streets, the world watched as a 
nation experienced its largest protest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.1 
Iran’s 2009 presidential election, a contest primarily between two leading 
candidates, incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and reformist candidate 
Mir Hossein Mousavi, illustrated the dichotomy between traditional, con-
servative Iranians and an invigorated wave of progressive, reform-
oriented voters.2 After Iran’s Interior Ministry announced Ahmadinejad 
the winner, Iranians discontent with the election outcome participated in 
numerous demonstrations disputing an allegedly fraudulent election 
that did not represent the true voice of the people.3 For the protesters, 
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1 Thomas Erdbrink, Amid Impasse, Rivals Rally in Iran: Ruling Clergy Agree to Partial Re-
count of Friday’s Ballots, Wash. Post, June 17, 2009, at A1. 
2 See Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Election in Dispute as Two Candidates Claim Victory; Ahmadi-
nejad Official Leader, but Mousavi Alleges Fraud, Wash. Post, June 13, 2009, at A1. 
3 See id. 
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the phrase, “Where is my vote?,” became the battle cry of the move-
ment.4 
 Following his reelection, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian govern-
ment initiated violent efforts to quell protests.5 This led to hundreds of 
injuries and arrests, prison rape and torture, and even deaths.6 Ahmad-
inejad demanded that opposition leaders be tried for their actions, ex-
emplifying the government’s harsh line against peaceful protest.7 
 The Iranian government’s actions against peaceful protesters 
clearly violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) to which Iran is a party.8 The extent to which Iran’s election 
laws violate the ICCPR, however, is less than clear. President Ahmadine-
jad celebrated his reelection as “glorious and fully democratic.”9 Yet giv-
en Iran’s uniquely structured government, claiming to be both a theoc-
racy and a democracy, its election laws and the role of the Guardian 
Council also reflect this often contradictory theme.10 
 Part I of this Note provides a synopsis of some of the unique fea-
tures of the Islamic Republic’s government relating to elections. Part II 
discusses the extent to which Iran’s presidential election law conforms 
to the ICCPR. Part III analyzes the availability of international legal re-
course for provisions that do not comply with the ICCPR, specifically 
through United Nations (U.N.) institutional and multilateral mecha-
nisms. Although problems of enforceability abound, there should ulti-
mately be some organized international effort to influence domestic 
transformation of undemocratic elections without infringing on state 
sovereignty. 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Nazila Fathi, A Recount Offer Fails to Silence Protests in Iran, N.Y. Times, June 17, 
2009, at A1. 
5 See Erdbrink, supra note 2. 
6 Prosecute Opposition Leaders—Iranian President, Trend Daily News (Azer.), Aug. 28, 
2009, http://en.trend.az/news/other/1530557.html. 
7 Id. 
8 Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Iran in Turmoil: Understanding Political Divisions and Advocat-
ing Human Rights, MIT Int’l Rev., July 2009, http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2009/online/iran-
crisis.html. 
9 Tina Susman, Iran Leader Extols Himself and Denounces Israelis, L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 
2009, at A24. 
10 See Ladan Bouroumand & Roya Bouroumand, Is Iran Democratizing? Reform at an Im-
passe, in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East 130, 132–33 (Larry Diamond et al. 
eds., 2003). 
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I. Background 
A. Unique Features of the Iranian Government 
 In understanding the democratic underpinnings of Iranian elec-
tion law, it is necessary to briefly discuss some of the unique mechanisms 
of Iranian government.11 As a theocratic democracy, or self-proclaimed 
“Islamic Republic,” the democratic aspects of Iranian government are 
intertwined with, and often trumped by, Islamic law.12 First, sovereignty 
is sanctioned by God and delegated to the Supreme Leader, an Islamic 
cleric who has absolute power in determining whether legislation and 
political actions conform to Islam.13 In 1989, the Assembly of Experts, a 
body of clerics elected by the people and charged with monitoring the 
Supreme Leader, appointed Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei.14 The Supreme Leader is the highest-ranking political 
and religious official in the government.15 With much more power and 
influence than the president or Parliament, he authorizes domestic and 
foreign policy, serves as head of the military, has broad appointment 
power, and has the sole power to declare war.16 
 Second, the Iranian Constitution mandates another powerful insti-
tution that assures laws are compatible with Islam.17 The Guardian 
Council, composed of six clerics and six lawyers appointed by the Su-
preme Leader and the judiciary, has the power to interpret the consti-
tution, veto parliamentary resolutions, and supervise presidential and 
parliamentary elections.18 For example, the Guardian Council must ap-
prove all prospective presidential candidates before they are allowed to 
run for office, and election results are not official until the Guardian 
Council certifies them.19 
                                                                                                                      
11 Cf. Mehrangiz Kar, The Deadlock in Iran: Constitutional Constraints, in Islam and De-
mocracy in the Middle East 157, 161 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic includes overwhelmingly antidemocratic fea-
tures). 
12 Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 132–33. 
13 Id. 
14 See Maureen Hoch, Government Profile: Iran, PBS NewsHour, Nov. 8, 2005, http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iran/structure.html. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran] 1358 [1980] arts. 107, 108, 110. 
18 Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Is-
lamic Republic 13–14 ( John O’Kane trans., 1997). 
19 Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 133. 
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 Third, the president’s role in the Iranian government is executive 
in nature, but his powers extend only to those not reserved for the Su-
preme Leader.20 He also shares executive power with the Council of 
Ministers, a cabinet selected by the president and confirmed by Parlia-
ment.21 While the president’s actual political power vis-à-vis other insti-
tutional bodies is limited, he does serve as the liaison between each 
branch of government.22 The president manages Iran’s economic pol-
icy and plays some role in foreign policy and national security, though 
his actions and political decisions are ultimately subject to the Supreme 
Leader’s approval.23 
B. Electing the President 
 The Guardian Council plays an extremely important role in the 
election process.24 The constitution requires the Guardian Council to 
supervise national elections and to approve all prospective candidates 
for president.25 According to the constitution, presidential candidates 
must not only be of Iranian origin and nationality, but must also meet 
certain religious and moral standards.26 In many elections, this greatly 
curtails the number of people who may actually run as official candi-
dates for the office.27 For example, hundreds of potential candidates 
may register, but the Guardian Council may choose to select far fewer 
for the final slate.28 
 In order to vote, Iranians must present their national identifica-
tions, or shenasnameh, at any polling location in the country.29 Since 
there is no national electoral registry, electoral officers stamp voters’ 
national identifications with an ink seal, certifying that the voters have 
not already voted in the current election.30 Ballots have a detachable 
slip that is removed before a voter enters the voting booth.31 The voter 
                                                                                                                      
20 Schirazi, supra note 18, at 16. 
21 See Hoch, supra note 14. 
22 Schirazi, supra note 18, at 16. 
23 The Iranian Political System, Al-Jazeera, June 11, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/ 
news/middleeast/2009/06/200961111422655588.html. 
24 Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 133. 
25 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran arts. 99, 118; Bouroumand & Bouroumand, 
supra note 10, at 133. 
26 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran art. 115. 
27 See Andres Sosa Clavel, The Electoral System in Iran and Presidential Elections, 6 Mundo 
Electoral (2009), available at http://174.36.232.8/html/index.php?id=358. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
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manually writes the name of his desired candidate and deposits the re-
maining portion of the ballot into the ballot box.32 Once the Interior 
Ministry, charged with overseeing election procedures,33 counts the bal-
lots and announces the results, the Guardian Council certifies the elec-
tion.34 Finally, the Supreme Leader officially declares the winning can-
didate by issuing a presidential decree.35 This is an important provision 
to note, especially in the 2009 election.36 Once the Supreme Leader 
declares the winner, protesting the results is an affront not only to the 
election itself, but also to the authority of the Supreme Leader.37 
 These voting procedures provide the most opportunity for fraud.38 
The speed with which officials counted the ballots in the 2009 election 
is a strong indicator of foul play, but there is no hard evidence of actual 
fraud.39 At each polling station, electoral officers count and record 
votes on a form approved by candidate representatives, the Interior 
Ministry, and the Guardian Council, though the information on the 
forms is kept secret.40 The Interior Ministry then compiles these forms 
and reports the final results.41 In the 2009 election, however, govern-
ment officials counted half of the over forty million hand-written paper 
ballots within three hours of the polls closing, an extremely unrealistic 
feat.42 
 Election fraud is not a problem specific to Iran; even highly democ-
ratized countries like the United States suffer from charges of election 
fraud.43 Nevertheless, what is especially problematic about the 2009 Ira-
nian presidential election is the relation between the inability to contest 
fraudulent results and the anti-democratic nature of the election struc-
                                                                                                                      
32 See id. 
33 Erdbrink, supra note 2. 
34 Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 133. 
35 Adineh Abghari, Introduction to the Iranian Legal System and the Protec-
tion of Human Rights in Iran 17 (2008). 
36 See Thomas Erdbrink & William Branigin, Police Unleash Force on Rally in Tehran; Ob-
ama, in Boldest Terms Yet, Presses Iran to Halt Violence Against Own People, Wash. Post., June 
21, 2009, at A1. 
37 See id. 
38 Glenn Kessler & Jon Cohen, Signs of Fraud Abound, but Not Hard Evidence, Wash. 
Post, June 16, 2009, at A1. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration 
to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 942 (2005). 
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ture.44 Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations have at-
tempted to establish standards for democratic elections through the 
adoption of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).45 Similarly, Article 25 of the ICCPR broadly calls for the will of 
a nation’s people to be expressed through universal and equal suf-
frage.46 While it may be difficult to enforce these definitions, they pro-
vide a framework for analyzing the democratic weight of Iranian elec-
tion law. As a U.N. member nation and signatory to the ICCPR, Iran is 
obligated to abide by the provisions governing free and fair democratic 
elections.47 
II. Discussion 
A. Criteria for Free and Fair Elections 
 Article 25 of the ICCPR establishes the right to free and fair elec-
tions, stating that: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . . to 
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives; to vote and to be elected at ge-
nuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors; to have access, on 
general terms of equality, to public service in his country.48 
These principles are specifically reaffirmed and endorsed by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair 
Elections (Election Criteria), to which Iran is also a signatory.49 Though 
the IPU mainly focuses on maintaining relationships between parlia-
mentary governments, it provides an in-depth framework by which 
member nations should abide in any election.50 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Shirin Ebadi, Keynote Address: Islam, Human Rights, and Iran, 23 Emory Int’l L. 
Rev. 13, 19 (2009); Kar, supra note 11, at 161. 
45 R. Michael Alvarez et al., Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Elec-
toral Manipulation 2 (2008). 
46 See U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
47 See U.N. Charter art. 2. 
48 See ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 25. 
49 Election Process: Analysis and Updates, Int’l Campaign for Hum. Rts. in Iran, Mar. 7, 
2008, http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2008/03/election-rep [hereinafter Election Process]. 
50 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Prac-
tice 21 (1994). 
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 This framework expands on the general election rights under the 
UDHR, explicitly stating the requirements for an election to be free and 
fair.51 One important provision entitles voters the right to equally 
weighted votes, which is particularly relevant in cases of election fraud.52 
The Election Criteria also include the right to an equal opportunity to 
run for political office.53 Moreover, individuals or political parties whose 
candidacy rights are restricted “shall be entitled to appeal to a jurisdic-
tion competent to review such decisions and to correct errors promptly 
and effectively.”54 
 The IPU also sets forth the rights and responsibilities of states in 
running free and fair elections.55 It advises states to establish election 
frameworks in accordance with their national constitutions, but also “in 
accordance with their obligations under international law.”56 National 
governments should enact measures reflecting impartial and transpar-
ent election systems, such as monitoring ballot counting and prevent-
ing fraud.57 Particularly significant in the context of Iranian elections, 
the IPU urges states to “ensure that violations of human rights and 
complaints relating to the electoral process are determined promptly 
within the timeframe of the electoral process and effectively by an in-
dependent and impartial authority, such as an electoral commission or 
the courts.”58 
B. Conformity to International Law and Democratic Norms 
 The fact that Iran has an established election system is important, 
especially given the theocratic elements of its government.59 Yet it is 
unclear that all of its election provisions meet even the broadly defined 
standards set forth in the ICCPR.60 Some of these provisions, such as 
requirements that candidates are of Iranian nationality and are elected 
by absolute majority, are uncontroversial and generally comply with 
normative democratic principles.61 The Guardian Council’s role in the 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (Mar. 
26, 1994), available at http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra note 51. 
58 See id. 
59 See Schirazi, supra note 18, at 14. 
60 See Election Process, supra note 49. 
61 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 50, at 54. 
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administration of elections, however, is one of the most troubling as-
pects of Iranian election law.62 
 Although the Guardian Council supervises elections in an admin-
istrative context, its role in approving all prospective candidates con-
flicts with democratic norms.63 First, the Guardian Council excludes 
candidates because of certain political ideologies, especially if they 
drastically conflict with the ideology of the Guardian Council or elec-
tion officials.64 Because the Islamic Republic bans independent political 
parties, the Interior Ministry disqualifies candidates on this basis even 
before they reach the Guardian Council.65 For example, the Interior 
Ministry automatically disqualifies candidates who have participated in 
or sympathized with nationalist, democrat, or socialist parties.66 
 Second, candidates must meet a religious and moral standard, 
which the Guardian Council decides and subjectively administers.67 
Even after the Ministry of Information investigates a candidate’s politi-
cal “legitimacy,” the Guardian Council evaluates his beliefs and behav-
ior.68 For instance, it determines whether women in his family wear a 
chador, whether the candidate attends religious services, whether he 
participates in events supporting the regime, and whether he has criti-
cized the government or the Supreme Leader.69 
 During this process, the Guardian Council is not required to justify 
its decisions and is accountable only to the Supreme Leader.70 Candi-
dates and other citizens must appeal to the Guardian Council itself if 
they are dissatisfied with the final list of candidates or the results of the 
election.71 This lack of accountability makes it highly unlikely that an 
appeal will be successful, given the lack of oversight by other govern-
mental bodies, such as the judiciary or Parliament.72 In 2009 for exam-
ple, Mousavi, the favored but losing candidate, disputed the results of 
the election and called for its annulment.73 The government refused to 
                                                                                                                      
62 See Election Process, supra note 49. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 134. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 134. 
72 Id. 
73 See Shoamanesh, supra note 8. 
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invalidate the election, and after a speedy partial recount the Guardian 
Council reaffirmed its initial decision.74 
 Thus, the legal provisions governing the Guardian Council’s role 
violate the principle that citizens have an “equal opportunity to become 
a candidate for election” established in the IPU’s Election Criteria.75 
Although Iranian citizenship requirements can be applied objectively, 
the religious and moral fitness requirement leaves enormous discretion 
to the unelected Guardian Council in essentially cherry-picking candi-
dates to its own liking.76 As an ideological barrier to political participa-
tion, this criterion violates not only Article 25 of the ICCPR, but also 
Article 19, which guarantees freedom of expression.77 This outcome 
has anti-democratic consequences for the people of Iran as well as for 
the candidates themselves.78 Because the group of candidates for which 
citizens may vote is pre-selected by the Guardian Council, Iranians are 
deprived of the full ability to freely choose their representatives.79 Prac-
tically, of course, a State may narrow down its list of candidates to make 
the final choice more feasible, or restrict candidates by age or resi-
dence.80 The fact that the candidate selection process is run by an un-
elected body, however, detracts from the election as a full expression of 
the will of the people.81 
 Rather than compare a nation’s election laws to a broad interna-
tional normative standard, some international election specialists con-
tend that “evaluations should be made within the historical and politi-
cal context of the country in question.”82 The Iranian people played a 
critical role in the creation of the Islamic Republic through the 1979 
Revolution, after a long history of thwarted attempts at democracy be-
cause of external interference and dictatorial rule.83 In this vein, there-
fore, the current government and its laws must at least to some extent 
be taken seriously.84 
                                                                                                                      
74 Borzou Daragahi & Ramin Mostaghim, Iran Council Declares Disputed Election Valid: 
Conservative Panel Quickly Completes Vote Count, Discounts Claims of Violations, Chi. Trib., June 
30, 2009, at C14. 
75 See Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra note 51. 
76 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 50, at 55. 
77 See id. 
78 See Ebadi, supra note 44, at 19. 
79 See ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 25. 
80 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 50, at 54–55. 
81 See ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 25; Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 
134. 
82 Alvarez et al., supra note 45, at 2. 
83 See Schirazi, supra note 18, at 291–92. 
84 Alvarez et al., supra note 45, at 2. 
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 In similar fashion to the 1979 uprising, the Iranian people de-
manded action from their government after the 2009 presidential elec-
tion.85 The allegations of an undemocratic presidential election initially 
came from the Iranian people, rather than from an external source.86 
More importantly, because of the Guardian Council’s dominant role in 
elections, Iranians disconcerted with the results, fraudulent or not, 
have no de facto legal recourse.87 The Guardian Council, rather than the 
courts, reviews all election challenges.88 Appealing to the very govern-
ment body that approves presidential candidates and refuses to disclose 
official ballot reports is effectively meaningless.89 While there are valid 
concerns about the role of international law in disputed domestic elec-
tions, there must be some international support for the citizens of a 
government that belongs to numerous international treaties but fails to 
abide by them.90 
III. Analysis 
 A more democratic, appealable election structure should ulti-
mately be the product of internal reform.91 There are, however, oppor-
tunities for the international community to significantly impact Iranian 
domestic legal change without drastically interfering with sovereign 
authority.92 Disputes with Iran over nuclear proliferation and security 
concerns make the international community more cautious in dealing 
with Iran.93 Acting in a way that reaffirms a commitment to fair elec-
tions without delving too deeply into Iran’s internal affairs is particu-
larly important.94 
                                                                                                                      
85 See Erdbrink, supra note 2. 
86 See id. 
87 See Bouroumand & Bouroumand, supra note 10, at 134. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See Shoamanesh, supra note 8. 
91 See Harry Kreisler, The Struggle for Human Rights in Iran: Conversation with Shirin Ebadi, 
Conversations with History, May 10, 2006, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people6/ 
Ebadi/ebadi-con4.html. 
92 See Karl J. Irving, The United Nations and Democratic Intervention: Is “Swords into Ballot 
Boxes” Enough?, 25 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 41, 42 (1996). 
93 See Moni Basu, Melissa Gray & Joe Sterling, Iran Fallout Scenarios: “Political Damage” or 
Diplomatic Gains?, CNN, Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/25/anal- 
ysis.iran.nuclear/index.html. 
94 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 50, at 27. 
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A. International Political Pressure: An Analogy to Human Rights Advocacy 
 In light of the Iranian government’s recalcitrance vis-à-vis its inter-
national legal obligations, the international community should exert 
political pressure on Iran to reform its election laws.95 Although politi-
cal pressure may not immediately convince the government to amend 
its election laws or administer elections more carefully, it may at mini-
mum force the government to engage in dialogue on the subject of its 
election laws.96 In reality, the government does alter its behavior in re-
sponse to external pressure, even as it announces its absolute resistance 
to international demands.97 This tactic is used to help release political 
prisoners and often has positive results.98 As Iranian human rights law-
yer and Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi articulates: 
On the surface, the Iranian government shows that it will not 
take action based on the concerns raised by the international 
community. But the truth is different. For 15 years . . . experi-
ence has shown me that when the world voices its concern 
over the arrest of a political prisoner, it puts a lot of pressure 
on the government. It has to react in some way.99 
 Haleh Esfandiari’s release from Iran’s Evin Prison demonstrates 
that broad international support can be a successful means of influenc-
ing the Iranian government.100 In 2006, Iranian authorities arrested 
Esfandiari, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars’ Middle East Program, for alleged crimes against Iranian na-
tional security.101 Esfandiari’s release came after multilateral interna-
tional appeals to Iranian government officials.102 For example, Wilson 
Center President and former U.S. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton suc-
cessfully appealed to Supreme Leader Khamenei after failed attempts 
                                                                                                                      
95 See Shoamanesh, supra note 8. 
96 See Ebadi, supra note 78, at 22. 
97 Id. 
98 See Maziar Bahari, Four Months Inside an Iranian Prison, Newsweek, Nov. 30, 2009, at 
41 (explaining that international pressure to free Bahari from prison influenced his even-
tual release); Ebadi, supra note 78, at 22; cf. Robin Wright, Iran Frees U.S. Scholar from Prison, 
Wash. Post., Aug. 22, 2007, at A10 (stating that American social scientist Kian Tajbakhsh 
and others are still detained for alleged roles in postelection protests). 
99 See Ebadi, supra note 78, at 22. 
100 See Haleh Esfandiari, My Prison, My Home: One Woman’s Story of Captivity 
in Iran 205–07 (2009) (explaining that international efforts hastened her release from 
prison); Wright, supra note 98. 
101 Wright, supra note 98. 
102 Id. 
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to contact other Iranian leaders.103 Additionally, former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, European Union foreign policy leader Javier So-
lana, and diplomats from more than 20 governments appealed to Ira-
nian officials and the foreign ministry.104 By Esfandiari’s own account, 
she knew her release was imminent when her jailer informed her that 
then-Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton issued statements 
about her detainment.105 
 International criticism of the Iranian government’s civil rights re-
cord will also influence the level of its domestic support.106 The current 
regime is noticeably concerned with its image, exemplified by its at-
tempt to deflect attention from the election.107 For this reason, the in-
ternational community must be persistent in pressuring the Iranian 
government to abide by ICCPR election standards.108 Shortly after the 
2009 election, for example, President Ahmadinejad repeated his infa-
mous anti-Semitic statements.109 An outraged international community 
castigated him for his insensitive and blatantly incorrect comments.110 
Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad succeeded in avoiding the hard questions 
about the election and subsequent rights violations in Iran at the U.N. 
General Assembly.111 International criticism against Iran for its disre-
gard of the ICCPR and other treaties is especially important at a time 
when citizens are defiant of the government’s rule.112 This timely pres-
sure would demonstrate to Iranians the international community’s 
support for and commitment to fair and democratic elections, not just 
its reactions to Ahmadinejad’s “provocative rhetoric.”113 
                                                                                                                      
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Esfandiari, supra note 100, at 152–54. 
106 Trita Parsi, Will the Focus at the UN be on Ahmadinejad’s Human Rights Abuses?, Atlantic 
Free Press, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/news/1/11675-will-the-focus- 
at-the-un-be-on-ahmadinejads-human-rights-abuses-.html. 
107 See id. 
108 See Shoamanesh, supra note 8. 
109 Parsi, supra note 106. 
110 Susman, supra note 9. 
111 See Mark Landler & Nazila Fathi, President of Iran Defends His Legitimacy, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 24, 2009, at A14. 
112 See Parsi, supra note 106. 
113 Id. 
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B. Internal Influence Through External Means 
1. General Assembly Resolution and Multilateral Support 
 Political pressure should be applied primarily in the form of a U.N. 
General Assembly resolution because there is a legal basis for imple-
menting provisions of the U.N. Charter and the ICCPR.114 The United 
Nations can justify its position with legally binding documents that se-
cure the formal political rights of citizens, rather than merely engaging 
in arbitrary criticism.115 Similarly, the United Nations has a specific divi-
sion that assists in organizing and observing elections and is equipped 
to advise the General Assembly.116 The Electoral Assistance Division is a 
structured election unit with well-established rules and guidelines for 
election laws.117 From 1989 to 2005, the Electoral Assistance Division 
provided electoral assistance in ninety-six countries with expertise in 
various areas, such as election administration and electoral laws.118 
 A General Assembly resolution reaffirming the election rights set 
forth in the ICCPR and requesting that Iran provide a meaningful elec-
tion appeals process is also preferable to a Security Council resolu-
tion.119 The General Assembly’s duties and powers are more closely 
aligned with the maintenance of civil and political rights, whereas the 
Security Council’s role is more focused on maintaining peace and secu-
rity.120 More importantly, it is unlikely that China or Russia will agree to 
a resolution.121 China, for example, objects to U.N. election monitoring 
in a sovereign state as a violation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.122 
Iran may also reduce a Security Council resolution to a threat from the 
United States alone, defeating the purpose of organized international 
action.123 A General Assembly resolution, however, allows political pres-
sure to come from a more multilateral front, composed of representa-
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tives from all 192 member states.124 It is also more likely to pass, given 
the prior passage of General Assembly resolutions reaffirming the value 
of free and fair elections and proscribing electoral assistance.125 
 Individual nations should also engage in continuous political pres-
sure alongside a General Assembly resolution, especially as the interna-
tional focus drifts away from the elections to Iran’s nuclear program.126 
As the human rights examples illustrate, political pressure is most effec-
tive when invoked continuously.127 Pressure from countries with sub-
stantial diplomatic or economic ties with Iran, such as France, Ger-
many, Italy, and Brazil, may also be particularly effective.128 Shirin Ebadi 
has suggested that the European Union disengage in political dialogue 
with Iran “until the violence stops and fresh elections are held.”129 Yet, 
in light of global concerns over the development of Iran’s nuclear ca-
pabilities, many nations will view cutting off communication with Iran 
as an impractical strategy.130 A more moderate approach would be to 
include discussion about the election in negotiations with Iran regard-
ing its nuclear program.131 Foreign diplomats should pressure Iran to 
answer its citizens’ calls for democratic elections while still maintaining 
a firm hand on the nuclear energy issue.132 
 To be clear, this Note does not argue that the United Nations or 
other countries should demand a drastic government restructuring in 
order to make Iranian election laws more democratic. Elections are 
arguably “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” 
of the State, in which the U.N. Charter prohibits international interfer-
ence.133 The United Nations has recognized that the international 
community is not to evaluate a nation’s compliance with international 
                                                                                                                      
124 U.N. Charter arts. 3, 9; see Press Release, U.N., United Nations Member States, U.N. 
Doc. ORG/1469 ( July 3, 2006). 
125 See Stoelting, supra note 119, at 373–74. See generally G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. GAOR, 
46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991) (“enhancing the effectiveness of the 
principle of periodic and genuine elections”). 
126 See Basu et al., supra note 93. 
127 See Ebadi, supra note 78, at 22; Parsi, supra note 106; Wright, supra note 98. 
128 See Shoamanesh, supra note 8. 
129 See Dream, supra note 121, at 54–55. 
130 See Basu et al., supra note 93. 
131 See generally id.; Hamid Dabashi, Commentary: Huge Risks in Iran Sanctions, CNN, Aug. 5, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/08/05/dabashi.sanctions.iran/index.html 
(noting that the international community has refocused its attention to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram and away from the legitimacy of its regime, even though Iranians who view the election 
as invalid nevertheless support Iran’s pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program); Dream, supra 
note 121, at 54–55. 
132 See Dabashi, supra note 131; Wright, supra note 98. 
133 See U.N. Charter art. 2(7). 
2010] Democratizing Iranian Election Law Through International Legal Recourse 353 
norms based on its choice to adopt a certain type of election system or 
political structure.134 But Iran has ceded some of its sovereignty by vol-
untarily becoming a member of the United Nations and party to the 
ICCPR.135 When election procedures clearly limit the will of the people 
in violation of the ICCPR, the United Nations is justified to respond 
within its legal bounds.136 
2. The Failure of Economic Sanctions 
 Economic sanctions are another means to achieve an international 
policy objective.137 While widely used and currently in place against 
Iran,138 imposing sanctions with regard to Iranian election laws would 
be unproductive.139 Economic sanctions have a sizably negative effect 
on Iranian citizens but little to no impact on the Iranian government’s 
policies.140 U.N. Security Council sanctions, for instance, largely affect 
the most economically and politically vulnerable members of society.141 
As a result, sanctions become counterproductive, because the govern-
ment uses the adverse impact on its citizens to bolster its own position 
against the international community.142 
 Furthermore, it would be impractical to issue sanctions based on a 
failure to comply with ICCPR and democratic standards for elections.143 
Although there is legal precedent for the imposition of sanctions to 
encourage free and fair elections, such as the Security Council’s appli-
cation of sanctions against Haiti in 1993, there are at least two problems 
associated with placing additional sanctions on Iran.144 First, as dis-
cussed above, it is unlikely China will agree to sanctions for what it per-
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ceives as a domestic issue.145 Second, given Iran’s resistance to U.N. 
sanctions in the closely-scrutinized area of nuclear energy, it is doubtful 
that sanctions regarding domestic elections will have a stronger ef-
fect.146 Despite the 1737 sanction regime issued in 2006,147 Iran contin-
ued to build its nuclear program.148 Today, its nuclear capability re-
mains a pressing and unresolved international issue.149 
C. Looking to the Future: Election Assistance and Support for Domestic 
Initiatives 
 At the request of a member state, the United Nations can organize, 
supervise, or verify elections, as accomplished in Namibia, Nicaragua, 
and Haiti.150 U.N. involvement of this magnitude is rare and requires a 
specific General Assembly mandate.151 Nevertheless, the United Nations 
may also support international observation and election assistance 
through analysis, advice, or training, which are more accepted levels of 
involvement.152 The current Iranian government will likely oppose U.N. 
election assistance, but in many ways it may be in Iran’s interest.153 
 Considering the Iranian government’s diminished domestic sup-
port, it would be beneficial to the current regime to restore confidence 
in its citizens.154 As discussed, the government is furtively concerned that 
it lacks widespread domestic approval.155 In response to the protests, the 
government used force to squelch a potential uprising through the use 
of imprisonment, death sentences, and accusations of foreign-backed 
protests.156 The current regime has set the stage for defiance by its peo-
ple, and even by a few leading clerics.157 Concerns loom that continuing 
in this direction will lead to negative consequences for the govern-
ment.158 Inviting international bodies to evaluate the elections will le-
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gitimize the regime and the election system itself and potentially ap-
pease the opposition movement.159 If the government wants to remain 
in power, it cannot exclude its citizens from popular sovereignty to such 
a grave extent that they have no other option but to revolt.160 
 Until there is a U.N. mechanism for individual citizens or other 
states to submit complaints or request election investigations, these re-
quests must come from the Iranian government itself, an option it will 
likely reject.161 Another possibility, however, is for the international 
community to support any domestic initiatives established to modify 
Iranian election laws.162 Following the election, for example, many re-
formists called for initiatives to “make the Iranian political system 
transparent and respectful of the law.”163 If in the future Iranian citizens 
establish a grassroots campaign to amend election laws, the United Na-
tions and international community should provide assistance.164 
Conclusion 
 Diplomacy with Iran is complex. This Note does not favor political 
pressure to reform election laws at the expense of other concerns. The 
international community can and should, however, pressure the Ira-
nian government to address flaws in its election law, as it does in con-
fronting Iran’s human rights violations and nuclear program. These 
issues are closely intertwined with the anti-democratic provisions of 
Iranian election law. A different election outcome could have resulted 
in a more open foreign policy to the benefit of both Iran and the in-
ternational community. 
 Given the extreme power of Iran’s unelected leaders, especially the 
Supreme Leader, electing a president is one of the few opportunities for 
Iranians to participate in the political process. Regardless of whether the 
Iranian people are correct about a rigged election, their calls to create a 
more transparent election process should not be ignored. Demanding 
the ability to appeal election decisions to other branches, rather than to 
the Guardian Council, is duly justified under international and Iranian 
law. 
 By the same token, the Guardian Council’s influence over Parlia-
ment in passing new laws is strong, just as it is in other aspects of gov-
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ernment. Iranians who favor an election law structure reflecting de-
mocracy and transparency will meet steadfast resistance from the 
Guardian Council and current regime. Despite this likelihood, inaction 
is not the proper solution. Many Iranians have demonstrated their dis-
satisfaction with the status quo. In light of the hostile domestic political 
environment, Iranians will be better equipped to transform elections 
with the knowledge that they have international support behind them. 
